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Abstract
We introduce blockchains and distributed ledgers and describe their
potential applications to money and banking. The analysis compares
public and private ledgers and outlines the suitability of various types of
ledgers for different purposes. Furthermore, a few historical prototypes of
blockchains and distributed ledgers are presented, and results of their hard
forking are illustrated. Next, some potential applications of distributed
ledgers to trading, clearing and settlement, payments, trade finance, etc.
are outlined. Monetary circuits are argued to be natural applications for
blockchains. Finally, the role of digital currencies in modern society is
articulated and various forms of digital cash, such as central bank issued
electronic cash, bank money, bitcoin and P2P money, are compared and
contrasted.
Keywords: blockchains, distributed ledgers, digital currencies, modern
monetary circuit; credit creation banking; interconnected banking net-
work.
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”PARATOV. The madness of passion soon passes, and what remains
are chains and common sense that tells us that these chains are
unbreakable. LARISA. Unbreakable chains!”
Alexander Ostrovsky, Without a Dowry, A drama in four acts
1 Introduction
In this paper, we discuss blockchains (BCs) and distributed ledgers (DLs) in
retrospective and prospective, with an emphasis on their applications to money
and banking in the 21st century. Additional aspects are discussed in [25], [28],
[39].
Civilization is not possible without money, and, by extension, banking, and
vice versa. Through the ages, money existed in many forms, stretching from
the exquisite gold coins of the Phrygian King Midas, giant stones of Polynesia,
cowry shells, the paper money of Khublai Khan and other rulers who came after
him, to digital currencies, and everything in between. The meaning of money
has preoccupied rulers and their tax collectors, traders, entrepreneurs, laborers,
economists, philosophers, writers, stand-up comedians, and ordinary folks alike.
It is universally accepted that money has several important functions, such as
a store of value, a means of payments in general, and taxes in particular, and
a unit of account. The author shares the view of Aristotle formulated in his
Ethics: ”Money exists not by nature but by law.” Thus, money is linked to
government and government to money. In fact, anything taken in lieu of tax
eventually becomes money.
For the last five centuries, money has gradually assumed the form of records
in various ledgers. This aspect of money is all-important in the modern world.
At present, money is nothing more than a sequence of transactions, organized in
ledgers maintained by various private banks, and by central banks who provide
means (central bank cash) and tools (various money transfer systems) used to
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reconcile these ledgers. In addition to their ledger-maintaining functions, pri-
vate banks play a very important role, which central banks are not equipped to
perform. They are the system gatekeepers, who provide know your customer
(KYC) services, and system policemen, who provide anti-money laundering ser-
vices (AML). We argue that, in addition to the more obvious areas of application
of distributed ledger technology (DLT), for instance, digital currencies (DC), in-
cluding central bank issued digital currencies (CBDC), DLT can be used to solve
such complex issues as trust and identity, with an emphasis on the KYC and
AML aspects, [43]. Further, given that all banking activities boil down to main-
taining a ledger, judicious applications of DLT can facilitate trading, clearing
and settlement triad, payments, trade finance, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce DLs and briefly discuss their
different types in Section 2. We present historical instances of BCs and DLs in
Section 3, and describe what happened when they underwent hard forking. Bit-
coin, the most popular current application of DLT, is covered in Section 4, where
a few less well known facts about bitcoin are presented. Potential applications
of DLT to banking are discussed in Section 5. As an interesting potential area
of applications of BC/DLT, we introduce modern version of monetary circuit
in Section 6 and show that it can benefit from the BC/DL framework because
money moves in a gigantic circle (or several circles if the world economy as
a whole is considered). In addition, in the process of money creation by the
banking system as a whole, individual banks become naturally interconnected,
so that DLs are particularly suitable to describing their interactions. We dis-
cuss topics related to CBDC in Section 7, where we explain the rational for its
issuance and discuss practical aspects. In particular, we show that CBDC can
be used to implement the famous Chicago plan, [2], [7], of moving away from
the fractional reserve banking toward the narrow banking. We articulate the
differences between Chaum’s and Nakamoto’s approaches to DC and consider
their respective pros and cons. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
2 BCs and DLs
Databases with joint writing access have been known for decades. Several typ-
ical examples are worth mentioning: the concurrent versioning system (CVS),
Wikipedia, and distributed databases used on board of naval ships [31].
We start with articulating differences between centralized and distributed
databases. In a centralized database, storage devices are all connected to a com-
mon processor; in a distributed database, they are independent. Furthermore,
in a centralized database, writing access is tightly controlled; in a distributed
database, many actors have writing privileges. In the latter case, each storage
device maintains its own growing list of ordered records, which, for the efficiency
sake, can be organized in blocks, hence, the name Blockchain. To put it dif-
ferently, in a traditional centralized ledger, the gatekeeper collects, verifies, and
performs the write requests of multiple parties, tasks which are distributed in
the DL. It should not be taken as fact that these tasks are best distributed: the
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considerations of efficiency and specialization are relevant as well.
The integrity of the distributed database is cryptographically ensured at two
levels. First, only users possessing private keys, can make updates to ”their”
part of the ledger. Second, notaries (also called miners) verify that users’ up-
dates are legitimate. Once the updates are notarized, they are broadcast to the
whole network, thus ensuring that all copies of the distributed database are in
sync. There several types of distributed databases or ledgers. We list them in
increasing order of complexity:
(A) traditional centralized ledger;
(B) permissioned private DL (R3 CEV, DAH, and other similar projects);
(C) permissioned public DL (Ethereum, Ripple, etc.);
(D) unpermissioned public DL (bitcoin and the myriad others).
To control the integrity of DL, a variety of mechanisms can be used - proof
of work (PoW), proof of stake (PoS), third party verification, etc.
Which ledger should be used? It largely depends on the context. If no joint
writing access is required, as is the case with most legacy banking applications,
a centralized ledger can be used. If participants do need joint writing access,
but know each other in advance, have aligned interests, and can be trusted, as is
the case in clearing and settlement, a permissioned private DL can be employed.
More details are given in [19].
The best known application of BC/DL is the famous bitcoin, which exists
on an unpermissioned public DL whose integrity is maintained by anonymous
miners via PoW mechanism. BC/DL can be used for issuing CBDC. However,
the sheer scale of the economy precludes unpermissioned public ledger in the
spirit of S. Nakamoto, [32] to be used for this purpose, due to the enormous
computational effort required for PoW. Resurrecting digicash proposed by D.
Chaum, [13], is an exciting possibility.
In many instances, building a DL just to be au courant with times might
not be worth the effort.
3 Historical examples of BCs and DLs
3.1 Genealogical trees
The idea of a BC is certainly not new. BCs naturally occur whenever power,
land, or property change hands. Some of the earliest examples of BC are the
genealogical trees of royal (or, more generally, aristocratic or property owning)
families. In such a tree (or BC) the transfer of power from one sovereign to the
next is governed by well-defined rules and in most cases, occurs without commo-
tion. However, when these rules become ambiguous and open to interpretation
the tree can undergo a hard fork.
In addition to being a chain, a genealogical tree is a distributed ledger.
In order to agree on their respective legitimacy and marriage eligibility, royal
houses had to inform each other about births, deaths, marriages, and other
life events, thus keeping their versions of BCs in sync. In Figure 8 we show
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the genealogical tree of the House of Habsburg engraved by A. Durer. It was
distributed to other royal houses, as well as all imperial cities in the Holy Roman
Empire.
Usually forking of a succession tree is associated with wars and other acts of
violence. This is a cautionary tale for proponents of ubiquitous applications of
DLs without a possibility of resolving disputes outside of the ledger itself. Here
are two (of many) examples.
In Figure 8 we show a simplified genealogical tree of the House of Capet.
For ten generation, starting with Hugh Capet, the transfer of power from father
to son was smooth. However, the ambiguity occurred when all three sons of
Philip IV died without surviving issue, thus creating a power vacuum. In order
to resolve it, the peers of France applied the Salic law of Succession, by which
persons descended from a previous sovereign only through a woman are not
eligible to occupy the throne. The House of Plantagenet did not accept this
outcome and started the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453) against the House of
Valois, a cadet branch of the Capetian dynasty, which was a dynastic conflict for
control of the Kingdom of France. In the end, the Valois, established themselves
as Kings of France at the expense of the Plantagenets.
Similar conflicts occurred with regularity and for very similar reasons through-
out the history. For example, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748),
which involved all major powers of Europe, was fought to settle the question
of the Pragmatic Sanction and decide whether the Habsburg hereditary posses-
sions could be inherited by a woman. It was finally resolved in favor of Maria
Theresa, who became the only female ruler of the Habsburg dominions.
Closer to our times, an interesting example of Ethereum hard forking hap-
pened in July of 2016, as a result of fixing a theft of $60 Mil worth of Ethereum
from DAO. V. Buterin, [12], described the situation as follows:
”The foundation has committed to support the community consen-
sus on the admittedly difficult hard fork decision. ... That said, we
recognize that the Ethereum code can be used to instantiate other
blockchains with the same consensus rules, including testnets, con-
sortium and private chains, clones and spinoffs, and have never been
opposed to such instantiations.”
Once again, we see that ambiguity within a BC cannot be resolved via its
intrinsic mechanisms.
3.2 Land titles
In more recent times, land registry title deeds are more relevant examples of
blockchains. As per Land Registry,
”Title deeds are paper documents showing the chain of ownership
for land and property. They can include: conveyances, contracts for
sale, wills, mortgages and leases.”
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It is clear that titles are blockchains currently held in a central repository;
however, instead of miners, succession is verified by notaries. Titles are mean-
ingful candidates for being treated on DL. However, there are still some issues
which need to be resolved before it can be done. For example, recent lawsuits
by Mark Zuckerberg seeking to force hundreds of Hawaiians to sell to him small
plots of land located within the external boundaries of his 700-acre beachfront
property on the island of Kauai, is a good case in point. It illustrates that in
some instances, it is not possible to identify the first owner of land, and then
build a chain of ownership from the original owner to the present, resulting in
an ambiguous and potentially vulnerable BC.
4 The bitcoin ecosystem
Bitcoin is not the first digital currency by a long shot, and very likely is not
the last major one either. The astute reader will recognize that apart from
intriguing technical innovations, bitcoin does not differ that much from the
fabled tally sticks used in the Middle Ages. Its precursors include e-cash and
digicash invented by D. Chaum, and bitgold invented by N. Szabo, see [13],
[33].1
All building blocks of bitcoin ecosystem have been known for some time,
including two of the most important techniques in public-key cryptography, the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and the RSA encryption system, see [17],
[15], [35].2 Proof of work, based on cryptographic hash functions, specifically
SHA-256, is similar to hashcash invented by Back, [4]; while Merkle trees were
introduced in the seminal paper by Merkle, [30].
Ignoring such nuances as wallets, etc., we can describe the basic setup as
follows. Participants of the system are represented by their public/private key
pairs. The main control variable is the number of bitcoins belonging to a par-
ticular public key. This number is known to all participants at all times (in
theory). The owner of a particular public key broadcasts their intend to send a
certain quantity of bitcoins to another public key. Miners aggregate individual
transactions into blocks, verify them to ensure that there is no double spend by
competitively providing proof of work, and receive mining rewards in bitcoins.
A transaction is confirmed if there are at least six new blocks built on the top
on the block to which it belongs. A typical block is shown in Figure 8.
The size of mining rewards is halved at regular intervals; so that the total
number of bitcoins in circulation converges to 21 Mil. Currently there are about
16 Mil bitcoins in circulation. It is believed that 3-5 Mil are irretrievably lost.
Some 450,000 blocks have been mined so far; a new block is mined every ten
1There is a heated debate of the true idenity of Satoshi Nakamoto. Nick Szabo is often
mentioned as a potential inventor of bitcoin. Here is a small piece of evidence, which might be
of interest. Nakamoto’s initials are SN, while Szabo’s are NS. However, Szabo is originally a
Hungarian name, where the last name comes first, so his initials would be SN. An interesting
coincidence.
2While these techniques were discovered in the academic community in 1976 and 1978
respectively, they were known in the intelligence community since at least 1974.
6
minutes on average. Due to the fact that mining rewards are paid with new
bitcoins, transaction costs are claimed to be very low. This is a nifty bit of
sleight of hand however, because the value of existing bitcoins is constantly
diluted. Some representative bitcoin statistics is given in Figure 8.
Bitcoin promises are grand. Its proponents expect it to become a supra-
national currency eventually supplanting national currencies, which, in their
minds, can be easily manipulated. Many even believe that bitcoin is the modern
digital version of gold, due to the effort required for PoW, see, e.g., [33]. Whilst
bitcoin is clearly an impressive breakthrough, reality is much less grand than
perception, and is quite telling:
(A) A new block is created on average every 10 min.;
(B) The number of transactions per second (TpS) is approximately 7, com-
pared to 2,000 TpS on average handled by VISA;
(C) In monetary terms, the amount of transactions is about 100 Mil USD/day;
(D) Current real (not nominal!) transaction costs are 1.5 Mil USD/day,
1.5% of total volume; in 2012 it was whopping 8%, in 2014 - 6%;
(E) Mining is a cost of electricity game. In high energy cost countries miners
go bust: Swedish KnCMiner recently declared bankruptcy ahead of halving
miner’s reward. While exact numbers are not known, it is believed that bitcoin
consumes as much electricity as EBay, Facebook and Google combined;
(F) Miners are arranged in gigantic pools (so much for P2P mining!); AntPool
- 18.7%, F2Pool - 17.7%, BitFury - 7.7%, BTCC Pool - 7.4%, BW.COM - 7.3%.
Thus, a 51% attack becomes possible! There is a very high probability that six
consecutive blocks will be mined by the same actor (so much for checks and bal-
ances!). Most of all these pools are Chinese, partly due to low electricity cost,
partly due to high tech advances. Not only miners are predominantly Chinese,
so are the players - 91% CNY, 7% USD, 1% EUR;
(G) At the moment, the main purpose of using bitcoin is for speculation and
circumvention of capital controls in China.
It is truly amazing to see how miners are prepared to perform socially useless
tasks, as long as they are paid for it. A telling historical analogy jumps to mind:
During the contest for design of the dome of Santa Maria del Fiore, it was
suggested to use dirt mixed with small coins to serve as scaffolding. After the
dome’s completion the dirt was to be cleared away for free by the profit-seeking
citizens of Florence (proto-miners). It is clear that BC/DL is still awaiting its
Brunelleschi, [23].
T. J. Dunning, quoted by Karl Marx in Das Kapital, [29], put it succinctly:
”With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10 per cent.
will ensure its employment anywhere; 20 per cent. certain will pro-
duce eagerness; 50 per cent., positive audacity; ...”
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5 Potential usages of DLT in banking
5.1 Banking X-Road
No bank, however big, is an island; banks can only operate as a group. In the
process of their day-to-day activities, they become naturally interlinked. Due
to these linkages between banks, DLT can provide a useful tool for facilitating,
reconciling, and reporting their interactions. Given that internal technology is
bank specific, it is impractical to standardize bank infrastructure. However, it
is possible to bring them to a common denominator by emulating the success of
the Estonian X-Road and creating a DL solution for banking operations, which,
by analogy, can be called the e-bank X-Road. In this regard, DL will serve as
an adapter, not dissimilar to an electrical adapter.
In 1997 Estonia started to move to digital government. In 2001, A. Ansper
in his master thesis, [3], proposed a suitable design. He developed a distributed
P2P secure information system called the e-Estonia X-Road based on the idea of
adaptor. X-Road is the digital environment which links various heterogeneous
public and private databases and enables them to operate in sync. A small
company Cybernetica implemented this design for around 60 Mil EUR.3
Let’s describe a possible design for the e-bank X-Road. Given the non-
scalable nature of PoW, and unclear security properties of PoS, X-road has to
be controlled by trusted notaries or validators. Two financial institutions, rep-
resented by their public keys, use their respective adapters to agree on common
terms on a deal. They digitally sign and execute a smart contract, hash it,
and broadcast the hashed version to the X-Road participants. A quorum of
notaries digitally signs the hash (”laminates” it), and re-posts the signed hash
in the common X-Road layer. Validators are paid for their services, similarly to
central securities depositories.4
It is worth noting that a blockchain does not by itself guarantee unambigu-
ous ownership: steps are required to identify and resolve any ambiguities before
moving to a BC, and in addition, tools and mechanisms to resolve ambiguities
only discovered when the BC is already well established. Both of these require-
ments are underemphasized in current discussions of BC/DLT applications.
There are several smaller areas in which DLT can be used to reduce trans-
action costs and other frictions in the conventional system. Such areas include
but are not limited to:
(A) post-trade processing;
(B) global payments;
(C) trade finance;
(D) rehypothecation;
(E) syndicated loans;
(F) real estate transactions.
3Other countries tried to follow suite but not all attempts were unqualified success.
4Corda, recently described in a white paper by R3, might be a step in this direction, [10].
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5.2 Trade execution, clearing, settlement
The holy trinity of capital markets is trade execution, clearing, settlement.
While initial public offering of stock is an important rite of passage for a new
company, secondary trading is a mechanism for continually re-allocating own-
ership and control in a somewhat optimal fashion. In addition to stocks, many
other products, such as equity derivatives, interest rate swaps, commodities,
etc. are traded on public exchanges. Moving many over-the-counter (OTC)
products to exchanges is an important regulatory imperative [38].
Currently, there are three necessary steps to trade public securities:
(A) Buyers and sellers have to be matched;
(B) The transaction has to be cleared, i.e. novated to a central clearing
counterparty (CCP);
(C) The transaction has to be settled, i.e. delivery vs. payment (DvP) has
to take place; so that title and money can be transferred as expected.
These steps are characterized by vastly different time scales - trading often
takes place in milliseconds, while clearing and settlement take 1-3 days! Al-
though the proverbial T+2, T+3 irritate many people, they might be a bit too
fast to push for the T+15’ solution. The actual process is very involved and in-
cludes investors, custodial banks, exchanges, brokers (general clearing members
of CCPs), CCPs, central securities depositories, regulators, etc.
It is natural to ask if a different design of exchanges can improve the overall
process and make it more stable and less costly. The answer is yes and no. On
the pros side, there are several issues which the current set-up solves very well:
(A) counterparty credit risk management;
(B) netting;
(C) DvP and credit risk more generally, which is addressed by collecting Ini-
tial Margin, Variation Margin, and Guarantee Fund contribution from clearing
members;
(D) anonymity;
(E) ability to borrow stocks.5
On the cons side, numerous issues are rather disconcerting:
(A) cost;
(B) speed;
(C) need for reconciliation and failures.
It is clear that straightforward attempts to apply a blockchain to clearing
and settlement (thankfully, to the best of the author’s knowledge, nobody wants
to use it in trading per se) cannot be successful. The reasons are simple - in-
stantaneous settlement (T+15’ as it is occasionally called) obliterates all the
aforementioned advantages of the current system. It increases the money slosh-
ing around by at least an order of magnitude. Thus, slow clearing and settlement
5The thriller “Ronin” was not universally critically acclaimed: some critics struggled to
identify what it was about [40]. In the author’s view, it takes the difficult challenges of
transactions amoung many untrustworth parties which underlie many great thrillers and brings
them to the fore, making “Ronin” arguably the greatest of all thrillers (perhaps the ending
would have been different had the characters know about blockchain).
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is not so much a consequence of the technological backwardness of exchanges
and CCPs (although they are not always using cutting edge technology), but
rather a result of their modus operandi.
By using permissioned private ledger(s) one can certainly cut costs, some-
what increase speed of clearing and settlement, and reduce the number of failures
and hence the need for reconciliation. In particular, smart contracts, if they can
be legally enforced, can solve a part of the DvP conundrum, which will require
that both securities and cash are parts of the same ledger. While smart con-
tracts cannot solve all problems, they represent a step in the right direction.
A potential evolution of the trading-clearing-settlement triad is illustrated in
Figure 8.
5.3 Global payments, trade finance, rehypothecation
Global payments is another area, where DLT can be potentially useful. It is
important to note that, in spite of claims to the contrary, the payment system
is not broken but rather expensive. For instance, Real-Time Gross Settlement
system works well for domestic transactions but is inefficient and expensive for
foreign transactions. Thus, some synergies can be gained if a DL, which supports
several national currencies at once, is developed to replace the legacy system.
For trade finance, there is the potential to use BC/DL to simplify the flow
of information among all participants and smart contracts to partially solve the
DvP problem.
In the rehypothecation set-up, it is possible to use BC/DL to untangle the
ownership of the collateral. However, this is more of an accounting tool, rather
than a comprehensive solution because in many instances the actual legal own-
ership of collateral cannot be established with certainty.
6 Monetary circuit and money creation
6.1 Monetary circuit
For centuries, the origins, properties and functions of money have been debated
in countless expositions. In the fourteenth century, the sagacious French abbot
Gilles li Muisis lamented, [8]:
“Money and currency are very strange things; They keep on going
up and down and no one knows why; If you want to win, you lose,
however hard you try.”
In the twentieth century the great British economist John Maynard Keynes
shrewdly observed, [22]:
“For the importance of money essentially flows from it being a link
between the present and the future.”
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As was mentioned earlier, money is inherently linked with banking, which,
over many centuries, gradually evolved from full-reserve towards fractional re-
serve banking. For instance, the Bank of England founded in 1694 already
operated as a fractional reserve bank.6
In modern societies commercial banks are almost exclusively fractional and
produce money ”out of thin air”, see, [21], [42], [27]. This important fact is
thoroughly misunderstood by the modern macroeconomic thinking, which in-
correctly overemphasizes the intermediation aspect of banking and assigns the
money creation role to central banks instead of commercial banks. In reality,
commercial banks are not constrained by their deposits and can and do issue
money at will. At the same time, their ability to do so is restricted by banking
regulations, which impose floors on the amount of banks’ capital and liquidity,
so that money creation cannot go ad infinitum.
To understand the role played by money in the economy, one needs to fol-
low its flow and to account for non-financial and financial stocks (cumulative
amounts), and flows (changes in these amounts). Here is how Michal Kalecki,
the great Polish economist, summarizes the complexity of the issues at hand
with his usual flair and penchant for hyperbole, [36]:
“Economics is the science of confusing stocks with flows.”
In the author’s opinion, the functioning of the economy and the role of money
is best described by monetary circuit theory (MCT), which provides a unifying
framework for specifying how money lubricates and facilitates production and
consumption cycles in the society. MCT describes in the most precise way the
dynamics of the economy and explains how and by whom money is created.
More specifically, it describes the interactions among the five sectors, including
government, central bank, private banks, firms, and households. As part of
the MC, private banks play an outstanding role as credit money creators. In
this framework, central banks don’t create money directly, but rather accelerate
or slow down the process of money creation by private banks, by providing a
unique universal medium in the form of electronic cash for different banks to
control their inventories of assets and liabilities. A schematic representation of
the monetary circuit is given in Figure 1, which represents money flowing among
the above mentioned five sectors of the economy.
6.2 General aspects of money creation
Currently, there are three theories explaining money creation: the credit cre-
ation theory, the fractional reserve theory, and the financial theory of inter-
6The Bank of England was characterized by Marx, [29], as follows:
”At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associ-
ations of private speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments,
and, thanks to the privileges they received, were in a position to advance money
to the State. Hence the accumulation of the national debt has no more infal-
lible measure than the successive rise in the stock of these banks, whose full
development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694.”
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mediation, see, e.g., [21], [42], [27] and references therein. The author firmly
believes that only the credit theory advocated by Macleod, Hahn, Wicksell, and
Keen among others, correctly reflects the mechanics of linking credit and money
creation. Credit creation theory was popular in the nineteenth century, but, un-
fortunately, gradually lost ground and was overtaken by the fractional reserve
theory of banking, which, in turn, was supplanted by the financial theory of
intermediation. In the author’s view, the latter theory severely underempha-
sizes the unique and special role of the banking sector in the process of money
creation, and cannot rationally explain things like the global financial crisis of
2007-2008 and other similar events, which happen with disconcerting regularity.
This aspect is particularly important because currently there is a profound lack
of appreciation on the part of the conventional economic paradigm of the spe-
cial role of banks. For example, banks are excluded from widely used dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models, which are influential in contemporary
macroeconomics and popular among central bankers, in spite of the fact that
they systematically fail to produce any meaningful results [11]. It is clear that
a vibrant financial system cannot operate without banks, and that the banking
system is very complex and difficult to regulate because banks become intercon-
nected as a part of their regular lending activities. In addition to their money
creation role, banks regulate access to the monetary system, by providing KYC
and AML services.
6.3 Money creation by individual banks
We start with the simplest situation, and consider a single bank, which lends
money to a borrower who immediately deposits it with the same bank. Thus, the
bank simultaneously creates assets and liabilities. The size of the loan is limited
solely by regulations and bank’s own risk appetite. The full cycle from money
creation to money annihilation is shown in Figure 8. Money is pumped into the
system (created) when it is lent out by the bank and pumped out (annihilated)
when it is repaid. If the borrower repays, the principal is destroyed, but the
interest stays in the system. If the borrower defaults, the money stays in the
system indefinitely. The chain of money transfers from one owner to the next
is naturally described by a BC, ideally residing on DL.
6.4 Money creation by the banking system
A more complex case of asset creation by one bank and liabilities by a second
bank is illustrated in Figures 8, 8. Linkages between these two banks occur
because the first one has to borrow cash from the second, so that their central
bank cash holdings reach suitable levels. In this setup, it is clear that central
banks do not generate money themselves; instead, they play the role of liquidity
providers (if, for example, the second bank does not want to lend money to the
first), and system stabilizers (similar to the Watt’s centrifugal governor). Thus,
central banks are the glue, which keeps the financial system together. It is clear
that BC is even more relevant in the case in question.
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6.5 Bank lending vs. bitcoin and P2P lending
In view of the above, the key distinction between bank money creation and
bitcoin mining, P2P lending, etc., is evident. Banks create money ”out of thin
air”. Since bitcoin transactions are not based on credit, they simply move
existing money around. Same is true for P2P transactions - P2P operators are
strictly intermediaries, they don’t create money at all! Therefore, banks and
P2P operators lend on different scales: banks – money they don’t have, P2P
- only money they have. Hence, the P2P impact on the financial system as a
whole is very limited.
7 CBDC and negative interest rates
7.1 Why CBDC?
Can and should central banks issue DC? Recently, these discussions have been
invigorated by the introduction of bitcoin, [32], and a persistence of negative
interest rates, which plagued Medieval Europe in the form of demurrage,the
Brakteaten system, and numerous variations of the same tune for centuries.
Recall that demurrage was a tax on monetary wealth and required a massive
apparatus of coercion to be imposed efficiently. Today, even the best-in-class
economists seem to be unsure of its true nature; for instance, Prof. Rogoff
equates it with currency debasement, which is a very different mechanism, [37].
The idea of scrip money, i.e. money which requires paying of periodic tax
to stay in circulation, thus emulating demurrage, was proposed by S. Gesell,
the German-Argentinian entrepreneur and self-taught economist, in the febrile
post-WWI atmosphere, [20]. Subsequently, it was regurgitated by Irving Fisher
during the great depression, [18].
In the author’s view, it is a sad reflection of the current state of economic
affairs, and the level of economic insight, that the current low interest rate envi-
ronment has prevailed for such a long time, in spite it being such an ineffective
tool. Moreover, in some economies, such as Switzerland and Denmark, interest
rates have reached seriously negative levels.7
Negative interest rates can be used to simulate inflation; the crucial differ-
ence between these two regimes is that physical cash is very valuable under the
former, and highly undesirable under the latter. The last line of defense be-
tween us and meaningfully negative rates is paper currency. However, in many
societies, particularly in Scandinavia, cash is relegated to the far corners of the
economy already. It is not hard to imagine that in a few years’ time instead of
banknotes, we shall have CBDC, [5], [9], [26]. Once cash is abolished, interest
can be made as negative as desired by central bankers.
7One cannot help but notice with a modicum of satisfaction, that critics of the celebrated
Vasicek model for interest rates, [41], who vigorously attacked him for allowing short rates to
become negative, proved to be completely wrong.
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7.2 How CBDC can be issued?
Currently, there are two approaches to creating digital currencies on a large
scale. The first one, which has gained popularity since the invention of bitcoin,
is based on unpermissioned DL, whose integrity is maintained by notaries (or
miners), see, e.g., [14]. Participants in this BC are pseudo-anonymous since
they are hidden behind their public keys. However, in principle, they can be
identified by various inversion techniques applied to old recorded transactions,
[34].
An earlier approach was developed by Chaum, who introduced a blind sig-
nature procedure for converting bank deposits into anonymous cash, see [13].
Chaum’s approach is much cheaper, faster and more efficient than the bitcoin-
style one. However, it heavily relies on the integrity of the cash-issuing bank
rather than on trustless integrity of bitcoin secured by computational efforts of
miners. Central banks can follow either avenue for issuing digital cash. By do-
ing so, central banks will be indirectly providing access to their balance sheets
to general public. However, in either eventuality, central banks won’t be able to
perform KYC and AML functions and would still have to rely on commercial
banks, directly or indirectly, for doing so.
One possibility is as follows: a central bank issues numbered currency units
into DL, whose trust is maintained by designated notaries receiving payments
for their services. Thus, at any moment, there is an immutable record showing
which public key is the owner of a specific currency unit. Given that notary
efforts are significantly cheaper and faster than that of bitcoin miners, this
construct is easily scalable to satisfy needs of the whole economy. Moreover,
since the records of transactions are immutable, it is possible to de-anonymize
transactions thus maintaining AML requirements.
In summary, modern technology makes it possible to abolish paper currency
and introduce CBDC, which can also be used to address some of the societal
ills, such as crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, etc., and eliminate costs
of handling physical cash, which are of order of 1% of the country’s GDP. It
will smooth the motion of the wheels of commerce and help the unbanked to
become participants in the digital economy, thus positively affecting the society
at large.
7.3 How CBDC can be used to implement the Chicago
Plan
Moreover, CBDC makes the execution of the celebrated Chicago Plan of 1933,
originally proposed by D. Ricardo in 1824, for introducing narrow (full-reserve)
banking entirely possible - both firms and ordinary citizens can have accounts
directly with central banks, thus negating the need of having deposits with
commercial banks, see [2], [7], [6], [24]. In this case, banks will lose their central
position in the economy and become akin to utility providers. They would
have to maintain the amount of central bank cash equal to the amount of time
deposits. Such narrow banks would in essence become the guardians of the
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system by providing KYC and AML services and executing simple transactions.
In fact, in the wake of the global financial crisis, many central banks massively
increased their balance sheets, while commercial banks have chosen to keep
enormous quantities of non-mandatory deposits with them. Thus, the system
de facto has moved towards narrow banking.
8 Conclusions
While the idea of BC/DLs is not new, modern technology gives it a new lease of
life. DLT opens new possibilities for making conventional banking and trading
activities less expensive and more efficient by removing unnecessary frictions.
Moreover, if built with skill, knowledge, and ambition, it has potential for re-
structuring the whole financial system on new principles. We emphasize that
achieving this goal requires overcoming not only technical, but also political
obstacles.
While DLT has numerous applications, it is not entirely clear, which finan-
cial applications should be handled first. Exchanges, payments, trade finance,
rehypothecation, syndicated loans, and other similar areas, where frictions are
particularly high, are attractive candidates. DC, including CBDC, is another
very promising venue.
Currently, many applications of DL and related technology appear to be
misguided. In some cases, they are driven by a desire to apply these tools for
their own sake, rather than because the result would be clearly superior. In
other cases they are driven by a failure to appreciate that the current systems
may not be as they are because of technological reasons, but rather because of
business and other reasons.
So far, practical application of DLT in finance have been limited and a lot
remains to be done in order to achieve real breakthroughs.
Acknowledgement 1 The invaluable help of Marsha Lipton from Numeraire
Financial in thinking about and preparing this presentation cannot be overesti-
mated. I am grateful to several colleagues, including Alex Pentland and David
Shrier from MIT, Damir Filipovic from EPFL, Matheus Grasselli from McMas-
ter, and Paolo Tasca from UCL for their help and suggestions. As a CEO of
StrongHold Bank Labs, I am currently working on a new type of a digital bank,
which will be utilizing some of the ideas presented in this paper. I am grateful
to my colleague Julian Phillips from SHBLabs for his insightful and thorough
feedback.
References
[1] Acharya, V.V., Cooley, T.F., Richardson, M.P. and Walter, I. (Eds.) (2010),
Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the new architecture of
global finance, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, N.J.
15
[2] Allen, W.R. (1993), ”Irving Fisher and the 100 percent reserve proposal”,
The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp.703-717.
[3] Ansper, A., Buldas, A., Freudenthal, M. and Willemson, J. (2003), ”Scal-
able and efficient PKI for inter-organizational communication”, in Com-
puter Security Applications, Proceedings of 19th Annual Conference, IEEE,
pp. 308-318.
[4] Back, A. (2002), ”Hashcash-a denial of service counter-measure”, Working
Paper.
[5] Barrdear, J. and Kumhof, M. (2016), ”The macroeconomics of central bank
issued digital currencies”, Working Paper.
[6] Baynham-Herd, X. (2016), ”Banking Balance Sheets and Blockchain: A
Path to 100% Digital Money”, UBS Discussion Paper.
[7] Benesˇ, J. and Kumhof, M. (2012), ”The Chicago plan revisited”, Working
Paper.
[8] Bloch, M. (1953), ”Mutations mone´taires dans l’ancienne France: Premie`re
Partie, Annales. Economies, Societes, Civilisations”, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 145-
158.
[9] Broadbent, B. (2016), ”Central banks and digital currencies”, Speech at
London School of Economics.
[10] Brown, R.G., Carlyle, J., Grigg, I. and Hearn, M. (2016), ”Corda: An
Introduction”, R3 CEV, Working Paper.
[11] Buiter, W.H. (2009), ”The unfortunate uselessness of most ’state of the
art’ academic monetary economics”, Working Paper.
[12] Buterin, V. (2016), Blog post, https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/26/ on-
ward from the hard fork/ .
[13] Chaum, D. (1983), ”Blind signatures for untraceable payments”, in Ad-
vances in cryptology, Springer US, pp. 199-203.
[14] Danezis, G. and Meiklejohn, S. (2015), ”Centrally banked cryptocurrencies,
Working Paper.
[15] Diffie, W. and Hellman, M. (1976), ”New directions in cryptography”,
IEEE transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 22 No. 6, pp.644-654.
[16] Dwyer, J. (2016), ”Central Bank-Issued Digital Currency: Assessing Cen-
tral Bank Perspectives of DLT and Implications for Fiat Currency and
Policy Stimulus”, Celent Working Paper.
[17] Ellis, J.H. (1999) ”The history of non-secret encryption”, Cryptologia, Vol.
23 No. 3, pp.267-273.
16
[18] Fisher, I., Cohrssen, H.R. and Fisher, H.W. (1933), Stamp scrip, Adelphi
Company, New York, NY.
[19] Greenspan, G. (2015), ”Avoiding pointless blockchain project”, Working
Paper.
[20] Ilgmann, C. (2015), ”Silvio Gesell:“A strange, unduly neglected” monetary
theorist”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp.532-564.
[21] Keen, S. (2001), Debunking economics: The naked emperor of the social
sciences, Zed Books, London & New York.
[22] Keynes, J.M. (1936), General theory of employment, interest and money,
Macmillan, London.
[23] King, R. (2013), Brunelleschi’s Dome: How a Renaissance Genius Rein-
vented Architecture, Walker & Company, New York, NY.
[24] King, M. (2016), The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of
the Global Economy, WW Norton & Company, New York, NY.
[25] Lipton, A. (2016), ”Banks must embrace their digital destiny”, Risk Mag-
azine, Vol. 29 No. 7.
[26] Lipton, A. (2016), ”The decline of the cash empire”, Risk Magazine, Vol.
29 No. 10.
[27] Lipton, A. (2016), ”Modern Monetary Circuit Theory, Stability of Intercon-
nected Banking Network, and Balance Sheet Optimization for Individual
Banks”, International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, Vol. 19
No. 06, pp.1650034-1 - 1650034-57.
[28] Lipton, A., Shrier, D. and Pentland, A. (2016), ”Digital Banking Manifesto:
The End of Banks?”, in Frontiers of Financial Technology, VisionaryFuture,
pp. 117-140.
[29] Marx, K. (1867), Das Kapital: Kritik der Politischen O˝konomie, Verlag
von Otto Meisner, Germany.
[30] Merkle, R.C. (1987), ”A digital signature based on a conventional encryp-
tion function”, in Conference on the Theory and Application of Crypto-
graphic Techniques, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 369-378.
[31] Miller, S.J. (1993), ”A fully replicated distributed database system”, Re-
search Note ERL-0719-RN, Electronics Research Laboratory.
[32] Nakamoto, S. (2008), ”Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system”,
Working Paper.
[33] Popper, N. (2015), Digital gold: The untold story of Bitcoin, Penguin UK.
17
[34] Reid, F. and Harrigan, M. (2013), ”An analysis of anonymity in the bitcoin
system”, in Security and Privacy in Social Networks, Springer New York,
pp. 197-223.
[35] Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A. and Adleman, L. (1978), ”A method for obtaining
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems”, Communications of the
ACM, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp.120-126.
[36] Robinson, J. (1977), ”Michal Kalecki on the economics of capitalism”, Ox-
ford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp.7-17.
[37] Rogoff, K.S. (2016), The Curse of Cash, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton and Oxford.
[38] Skeel, D. (2010), The new financial deal: understanding the Dodd-Frank
Act and its (unintended) consequences, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ.
[39] Tasca, P., Aste, T., Pelizzon, L. and Perony, N. (Eds.) (2016), Banking
Beyond Banks and Money: A Guide to Banking Services in the Twenty-
First Century, Springer, Switzerland.
[40] Turan, K. (2004), Never Coming to a Theater Near You: A Celebration of
a Certain Kind of Movie, PublicAffairs, New York.
[41] Vasicek, O. (1977), ”An equilibrium characterization of the term struc-
ture”, Journal of financial economics, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp.177-188.
[42] Werner, R.A. (2014), ”Can banks individually create money out of noth-
ing? - The theories and the empirical evidence”, International Review of
Financial Analysis, Vol. 36, pp.1-19.
[43] Zyskind, G., Nathan, O. and Pentland, A. (2015), ”Enigma: Decentralized
computation platform with guaranteed privacy”, Working Paper.
18
Figure 1: Albrecht Dürer - The Triumphal Arch of Maximilian (Ehrenpforte
Maximilians I ) - House of Habsburg generalogical tree by A. Durer. It was
distributed to all imperial cities in the Holy Roman Empire. Albrecht Dürer -
National Gallery of Art: online database: entry 1991.200.1. Public Domain.
19
19
Figure 2: Genealogical chart (chain) of House of Capet. Hard fork was resolved
in favour of House of Valous at the expense of House of Plantagenet by invent-
ing the Salic law. The Hundred YearsWar commence as a result. Source:
Wikipedia.
20
20
F
ig
ur
e
3:
A
ty
pi
ca
l
B
T
C
bl
oc
k.
So
ur
ce
:
bl
oc
kc
ha
in
.in
fo
21
21
F
ig
ur
e
4:
So
m
e
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
bi
tc
oi
n
st
at
is
ti
cs
.
So
ur
ce
:
w
w
w
.q
ua
nd
l.c
om
22
22
Figure 5: (A) Current organization of share trading; (B) First improvement
of stock trading setup, CSD and CCP are replaced by BC/DL; (C) Second
improvement of stock trading setup, in addition to CSD and CCP, custodians
and stock transfer agents are replaced by BC/DL.
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Figure 6: A sketch of the monetary circuit.
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Figure 1: A sketch of the monetary circuit.
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